Introduction

Freedom of expression and media freedom in the Islamic Republic of Iran have consistently faced systematic restrictions and suppression. Iran perpetually ranks near the bottom of global press freedom indices; Reporters Without Borders placed Iran 176th out of 180 countries in its 2023 World Press Freedom Index. This situation reflects one of the most repressive environments for media and journalists worldwide. The central research question guiding this inquiry is: “How, and through what mechanisms, does the Iranian government suppress freedom of expression and censor media and cyberspace?” In response to this question, our hypothesis posits that “the government of the Islamic Republic, employing a combination of legal, security, and technological methods, has fostered an atmosphere permeated by fear and self-censorship within society, striving to silence any dissenting voice.”

To investigate this hypothesis, we will first examine the censorship of traditional media (press, radio, and television), reviewing restrictive laws, supervisory bodies, and instances of press closures and journalist detentions. Subsequently, the mechanisms of suppression in cyberspace will be explored, including internet filtering, the role of cyber institutions, and cases of user arrests. Following this, the suppression of freedom of expression in cultural and artistic spheres – encompassing restrictions imposed on artists and writers to the banning of books and films – will be detailed. The subsequent section will analyze the consequences of this censorship and suppression on society from the perspectives of public awareness, the prevalence of fear and self-censorship, civil activities, and public trust. Finally, after summarizing the findings and addressing the research question, recommendations for countering censorship will be offered, emphasizing the importance of freedom of expression for democracy and human rights, and expressing hope for a brighter future.

It is pertinent to note that this text relies on documented sources, including reports from international human rights organizations, academic research, and reports from credible media outlets. It endeavors to present a realistic and documented portrayal of the mechanisms of traditional and digital repression in Iran. The tone of the article is formal and analytical, focusing on facts, data, and evidence-based analysis.

Censorship of Traditional Media (Press, Radio, and Television)

Censorship in Iran’s traditional media has a long history. Following the 1979 revolution, the government swiftly established numerous legal and executive frameworks to control the press and other media outlets. Article 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates that “Publications and the press have freedom of expression, except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The details shall be specified by law.” While this article ostensibly recognizes press freedom, it introduces broad exceptions using general terms like “fundamental principles of Islam” and “rights of the public.” No specific ordinary law has been enacted to clearly define these exceptions, and this ambiguity grants authorities wide latitude to suppress dissenting voices. In practice, press freedom in Iran has always been contingent upon the government’s interpretation of concepts such as the interests of Islam and the regime.

Restrictive Legal Frameworks

The most significant legislation governing print media is the Press Law, enacted in 1985 (with subsequent amendments, including in 2009). Article 6 of this law enumerates numerous prohibited topics for publication. These include “publishing atheistic materials and content contrary to Islamic standards,” “propagating obscenity and vice,” “insulting the religion of Islam and its sanctities,” “insulting Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader,” “publishing materials contrary to the Constitution,” and similar items. This extensive list can effectively encompass any serious political or religious criticism, readily serving as a pretext for shutting down publications. Beyond content restrictions, the Press Law imposes stringent conditions for obtaining licenses and holds media managers accountable; for instance, the managing director of a publication must demonstrate practical commitment to Islam and the Constitution. A body known as the Press Supervisory Board oversees the granting of licenses and monitors the performance of the press. The composition of this board is such that the majority consists of representatives from governmental and conservative institutions (e.g., a representative from the judiciary, a representative from the Qom seminary, a representative from the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance or their representative). Consequently, even during periods when elected governments have exhibited more moderate tendencies, the legal structure ensures that strict oversight of the press remains in place.

In addition to the Press Law, the Islamic Penal Code provides the authorities with numerous legal tools to suppress expression. Articles such as Article 500 (propaganda against the system), Article 514 (insulting Imam Khomeini and the Leader), Article 513 (insulting sanctities), Article 609 (insulting government officials), and Article 610 (assembly and collusion against national security) are among those frequently employed against journalists, writers, and critics. These articles are often drafted using broad and vague language, allowing judicial authorities expansive interpretation. As such, almost any political or social criticism can be classified under “propaganda against the system” or “spreading falsehoods with the intent to disturb public opinion,” thereby incurring punishment. In effect, Iran’s penal code, by extensively criminalizing critical expression, severely restricts the boundaries of freedom of speech far beyond internationally accepted standards.

Supervisory and Security Institutions Overseeing Media

In the Islamic Republic, several governmental and state institutions directly or indirectly oversee traditional media and play a role in enforcing censorship:

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance: This ministry is responsible for issuing licenses to publications and conducting initial supervision of their content. The Press Supervisory Board (affiliated with the Ministry of Guidance) can issue warnings to publications or refer their cases to judicial authorities if violations are observed. Furthermore, the Ministry of Guidance has historically used the paper quota system and press subsidies as economic leverage to influence the editorial policies of publications.
Judiciary and Special Press Court: According to the Constitution (Article 168), press offenses must be tried publicly and with a jury present. However, in practice, the judiciary handles many media-related cases through the Culture and Media Prosecutor’s Office and Revolutionary Courts, often without adhering to fair trial procedures. Judges appointed by the judiciary, who are directly designated by the Supreme Leader, adopt a strict, security-oriented approach to media cases. On numerous occasions, the judicial system has issued immediate orders for the closure of a publication or the arrest of a journalist without regard for the requirements of a jury presence or a public trial.
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC): This council, chaired by the President and comprising high-ranking security and military officials, issues confidential resolutions or directives during critical times to restrict the dissemination of news. For example, amidst political unrest or street protests, the SNSC issues guidelines to the media instructing them to refrain from covering protests or to use specific terminology (such as labeling protesters “rioters”), effectively setting the red lines for media outlets. Although these resolutions are temporary, violating them can lead to swift judicial action. A well-known example is the council’s directive in December 2017 and November 2019 prohibiting extensive coverage of protests and cutting off internet access, the violation of which had serious consequences for the media.
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB – State Radio and Television): Although IRIB is itself a media outlet, its state monopoly and direct supervision by the Office of the Supreme Leader (the head of IRIB is appointed by the Leader) have effectively turned it into a tool for directing public opinion and eliminating dissenting voices. The Constitution (Article 175) declares radio and television media to be state-owned and does not permit the establishment of private stations. Therefore, IRIB faces no independent domestic competition and operates with a complete pro-government bias. Not only does this organization refrain from broadcasting any critical or dissenting voices, but in some cases, it becomes an instrument of repression by broadcasting forced confessions of political prisoners and detained journalists. For instance, in the case known as the “Bloggers Case of 2004,” several journalists and bloggers, after enduring pressure and imprisonment, were forced to make televised confessions, which were later revealed to have been coerced to justify actions to the public.

Documented Cases of Press Confiscation and Crackdowns on Journalists

The four-decade history of the Islamic Republic is replete with instances of publication closures and suppression of journalists. Whenever the press has found slightly more open space, a wave of repression has followed, shutting down dozens of publications. Here are a few prominent and documented examples:

Attack on Reformist Press in 2000: Following the election of the reformist government (Mohammad Khatami) and the relative opening of the press environment, dozens of critical newspapers and magazines were published. However, in late April and May 2000, the conservative establishment, guided by the judiciary at the time, launched an unprecedented assault on the press. Within just one week, 16 newspapers and publications, mostly reformist, were shut down by order of the prosecutor’s office. Prominent among these were the newspapers Sobh-e Emrooz (managed by Saeed Hajjarian), Mosharekat (managed by Mohammad Reza Khatami), and the weekly Ava, all closed in late April 2000 (early Ordibehesht 1379). This action followed a speech by Ayatollah Khamenei on April 19, 2000, in which he likened critical publications to “enemy bases.” Following these remarks, the Press Court and Tehran’s prosecutor rapidly shut down dozens of publications on charges of “acting against security” and “violating the press law.” The result of this widespread crackdown was the disappearance of critical press from newsstands and the establishment of a heavy atmosphere of self-censorship. Reporters Without Borders termed this event the “massacre of the press,” during which virtually all critical voices in the print media were silenced.
Closure of Aseman and Bahar Newspapers (2013): During the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, who came to power with slogans of moderation and civil rights, expectations were high for a more open media environment. However, in the very first year (2013), two reformist newspapers, Bahar and Aseman, were shut down in short succession. The accusation against these newspapers was “insulting Islamic sanctities” through the publication of controversial articles. Bahar newspaper was closed in October 2013 for publishing an article offering a historical interpretation of the Ghadir Khumm event, and Aseman newspaper was immediately shut down in February 2014 after publishing an article about Qisas (retribution) and using the term “inhumane” to describe it. President Hassan Rouhani, reacting to these events, criticized the judges’ extremism and stated that closing a newspaper for one mistake should not be the first reaction, adding, “If we break the pens and shut the mouths, public trust will be deeply damaged.” These remarks, made in March 2014, indicated that even the elected government was concerned that the continued method of closing newspapers would harm the regime’s social capital. However, the judiciary, influenced by hardliners, paid no heed to these warnings, and the pressure on critical press continued.
Case of Mass Arrests of Journalists (2013): In January/February 2013, on the eve of the 2013 presidential election, the Ministry of Intelligence of the tenth government (Ahmadinejad), in cooperation with the judiciary, arrested more than 10 journalists in Tehran. These journalists, working for reformist or independent media outlets, were accused of “cooperating with foreign media” and being part of an “enemy infiltration network in the press.” Although many were released on bail after some time, this case and the broadcasting of televised confessions from some of them created a severe climate of intimidation within the media community. Experienced journalists such as Saba Azarpeik, Pouria Alami, Akbar Montajabi, and others were among those arrested. This wave of arrests had such an impact that, according to observers, many journalists refrained from addressing sensitive political issues for a long time out of fear of security repercussions, leading to wider self-censorship.

In addition to the examples above, numerous other cases of media closures and suppression of writers mark the record of the Islamic Republic. From the closure of cultural magazines like Zanan (Women) magazine in 2007 on charges of raising women’s rights issues to the shutting down of student and local publications in the provinces, all indicate an intolerance for even the smallest independent voice in the traditional media sphere. The result of this trend is Iran’s ranking among the most dangerous countries for journalists. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders, Iran has consistently been one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists, and in recent years (especially after the suppression of the 2022 protests), this number has increased unprecedentedly.

Chart 1: The top five countries in the world by the number of imprisoned journalists in 2022. As seen, Iran ranked third with 47 imprisoned journalists (after China and Myanmar). The suppression of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests in this year led to widespread arrests of journalists, turning Iran into one of the largest prisons for media activists. This situation has placed severe pressure on independent journalists, forcing many to leave the country or abandon the profession of journalism.

In summary, regarding traditional media, it is observed that the Iranian government utilizes three fundamental pillars for censorship: restrictive laws that criminalize any critical expression; supervisory and judicial institutions that promptly shut down publications crossing red lines and arrest journalists; and an atmosphere of intimidation and severe punishments that leads to widespread self-censorship among media personnel. The result of such a combination is press and media outlets that either operate entirely in line with the government or, at best, address issues with extreme caution and by omitting red lines. Many critical journalists have either emigrated or been forced into inactivity, severely weakening the independent and critical voice.

Censorship of Cyberspace and the Internet

With the expansion of internet access in Iran from the 2000s onwards, cyberspace became a new arena for the free exchange of information and expression of views. The internet provided an unprecedented opportunity for citizens to access information and news outside the framework of official media and to publish their own voices. In parallel with this trend, the Iranian government employed methods and structures to control and censor cyberspace, and today Iran is considered one of the most restrictive countries regarding the internet. This section examines the legal and technical mechanisms of internet censorship, the role of cyber security institutions, documented cases of crackdowns on online activists, and the impacts of these restrictions on freedom of expression and public access to information.

Methods and Tools of Internet Filtering and Control

Iran implemented a filtering system (blocking access) from the early years of the internet’s prevalence. The legal framework for this was established in the Computer Crimes Law enacted in 2009. According to Article 21 of this law, the “Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content” was formed under the supervision of the Attorney General, responsible for identifying criminal websites and content and issuing filtering orders to internet service providers. This committee consists of representatives from 13 governmental and state institutions (including the Ministries of Guidance, Intelligence, Justice, Communications, IRIB, Police Force, etc.). The list of instances of unauthorized content prepared by this committee is extremely broad; it encompasses everything from “atheistic and anti-Islamic content” to “incitement to corruption and prostitution,” “content against the security and independence of the country,” “propaganda against the system,” “insulting officials and institutions of the system,” “encouraging people to boycott elections or weaken participation,” and so on. This breadth means that almost any website or content containing political or ideological criticism, or even independent reporting, can be blocked under one of these headings.

The technical methods of filtering in Iran have become more sophisticated over time. Initially, website blocking was primarily done using DNS filtering or IP blocking. However, more advanced technologies such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) are now used for intelligent identification and blocking of traffic. Reports also indicate that some internet providers block entire IP ranges (e.g., /24), which also leads to the accidental blocking of legitimate sites. Filtering in Iran has a very wide scope. All popular global social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have been filtered for years. The messaging app Telegram, which had tens of millions of Iranian users, was blocked by judicial order in April 2018. Recently, following the 2022 uprising, the two remaining platforms, Instagram and WhatsApp, have also been filtered. According to international organizations, Iran, alongside China, has the most extensive internet censorship program, and nearly half of the world’s top 100 most visited websites are blocked in Iran.

Chart 2: Percentage of popular global websites filtered in Iran. According to an Internet Society report in 2023, 49% of the world’s top 100 websites are blocked in Iran (in comparison, China has blocked about 64% of these sites). The filtered sites cover a diverse range: from social networks and international news media to many Google services (like the Play Store) and even some scientific and academic databases. Furthermore, according to these reports, over the past 14 years, more than 8 million internet addresses in Iran have been subject to filtering and blocking, indicating the persistence and severity of online censorship policies.

Beyond the continuous filtering of websites, the Iranian government also resorts to widespread internet shutdowns or disruptions during crises. For example, during the November 2019 protests, the national internet was almost completely cut off for a week, minimizing Iran’s connection to the global internet network. In the nationwide protests of 2022 (following the death of Mahsa Amini), the government also periodically disrupted mobile internet in many parts of the country and implemented complete shutdowns in some cities. These tactics aim to prevent the organization of protests and hinder the transmission of news and images of suppression abroad. Although complete internet shutdowns are temporary, they leave behind devastating economic and social impacts and constitute a clear violation of the people’s right to access information.

The government has also attempted to create a National Information Network (NIN) to reduce users’ dependence on the global internet. The NIN, sometimes referred to as the “Halal Internet,” is an infrastructure that promotes domestic online services (native search engines, domestic messaging apps, national email, etc.) while making access to foreign resources more restricted and expensive. An example of this strategy was the 30-40% increase in international internet tariffs in 2023, which, according to reports, was ordered by the government to encourage people to use domestic services. Nevertheless, statistics show that Iranian users widely use filter circumvention tools such as VPNs. Estimates indicate that at least 64% of Iranian internet users resorted to VPNs to access filtered social networks after 2022. The VPN sales market in Iran has become a lucrative industry, valued at around 5 trillion tomans in 2023. These statistics demonstrate that despite all restrictions, the social demand for free access to information remains strong, and many people incur costs and risks to achieve free news and communication.

The Role of Security and Judicial Institutions in Online Suppression

Control and suppression in cyberspace are not limited to technical measures; the country’s security and judicial institutions have also been actively involved in this domain. Several key institutions in this field include:

FATA Police (Cyber Police – Police for the Production and Exchange of Information Space): This unit of the Law Enforcement Force was established in 2010, tasked with handling computer and cybercrimes. FATA Police acts as the executive arm in prosecuting internet users. One of the most famous cases involving FATA Police is the Sattar Beheshti case. Sattar Beheshti was a critical blogger arrested by FATA Police in November 2012 who died in police custody just days after his arrest. Signs of beating and torture were observed on his body. Sattar Beheshti was arrested on charges of “acting against security through propaganda activities in cyberspace,” and his death had such repercussions that it even forced the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) to react and investigate. Ultimately, only one police officer was convicted of quasi-intentional homicide and sentenced to three years in prison. Sattar Beheshti’s death became a symbol of digital repression in Iran, showing that criticism in cyberspace could also cost an individual’s life.
Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): The IRGC Intelligence has played a prominent role in controlling cyberspace in recent years. This institution, by creating specialized units (such as the IRGC Cyber Command), identifies and suppresses online activists. One of the famous operations of the IRGC Intelligence was named “Operation Spider,” during which they identified and arrested a network of Facebook users. In February 2015, an IRGC cyber representative (Mostafa Alizadeh) announced on state television that 12 Facebook users had been arrested on charges of “spreading corruption and promoting Western lifestyles,” and 24 others had been summoned. He stated that the IRGC monitors all social networks and warned users not to consider cyberspace a safe environment. This project, introduced as Operation Spider, targeted pages that, according to the IRGC, published “anti-religious or immoral” content. The charges against the detainees, in addition to publishing indecent material, included “complaining about every societal problem with the intent of painting a bleak picture,” indicating that even social satire and criticism were under security scrutiny. Another example was the arrest of administrators of several reformist Telegram channels in March 2017 by IRGC Intelligence, who were held in temporary detention for months on charges of “acting against security.” Accordingly, IRGC Intelligence has effectively taken over a significant part of the policing and judicial function in the online space, suppressing any organized or influential movement through continuous monitoring of social networks.
Judiciary (Computer Crimes Prosecutor’s Office): As mentioned in the previous section, the Attorney General’s Office oversees the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content and serves as the judicial arm of filtering. Additionally, a Special Prosecutor’s Office for Computer Crimes has been established in Tehran and some provincial centers, tasked with handling internet-related cases. Over the years, the judiciary has issued heavy sentences for online activists. Ruhollah Zam, the administrator of the AmadNews Telegram channel, is a prominent example of such treatment. Zam, a political protester from 2009 living in exile in Paris, was surprisingly abducted by the Islamic Republic’s security agencies in Iraq in 2019 and transferred to Iran. After a closed trial, he was sentenced to death on charges of “corruption on earth” and several other security-related counts. Ruhollah Zam’s death sentence was carried out in December 2020, sparking a wave of shock and condemnation among human rights organizations. The execution of a journalist and media manager, especially after being abducted abroad, indicated that the government would resort to the most severe measures to silence dissenting voices. This act was condemned by Amnesty International as a “deadly blow to freedom of expression,” and UNESCO called it a violation of fundamental human rights. Besides Zam, the judiciary has issued long prison sentences for numerous citizen journalists and ordinary social media users. For example, in the case of the Erfan-e Halgheh group in cyberspace, several individuals were sentenced to years in prison for managing Facebook pages and websites related to this ideological group. Or Nikan Khosravi and Arash Ilkhani, members of a metal music group called “Confess,” were sentenced to 12.5 years and 2 years in prison respectively (plus dozens of lashes) merely for publishing protest songs online. Their charges included “insulting sanctities,” “propaganda against the system,” and “insulting the Leader and the President through song lyrics.” These examples demonstrate that the Iranian judiciary does not tolerate artistic and cultural expression in the online space either, placing it along the same lines as political repression.

Arrests of Users and Digital Activists – Documented Cases

The suppression of freedom of expression in cyberspace is not limited to prominent figures; numerous ordinary internet users have also faced security crackdowns due to their online activities. Here are a few documented examples from different years:

The Bloggers Case of 2004 (1383 SH): In 2004, one of the first waves of crackdowns on online activists occurred, later becoming known as the “Bloggers Case.” In this year, about 20 young journalists and bloggers were arrested by security agencies. Among those arrested in this case were Roozbeh Mir Ebrahimi, Shahram Rafizadeh, Omid Memarian, Fereshteh Ghazi, and Babak Ghafoori Azar. The detainees were held in solitary confinement for long periods, and some were later forced to confess and express remorse in televised interviews. Although most of these defendants were later released, and some left the country, eventually four individuals (Memarian, Mir Ebrahimi, Rafizadeh, and Gholam Tamimi) were tried in court in February 2009 (Bahman 1387) and collectively sentenced to several years of suspended and discretionary imprisonment and dozens of lashes. This case served as an early warning from the government to online activists: even writing on personal blogs could subject you to charges such as acting against security.
Arrests of Social Media Users: Throughout the 2010s (1390s SH), with the expansion of Facebook and Twitter, followed by Instagram and Telegram, news of the arrests of administrators of popular pages and channels was frequently published. For example, in 2017 (1396 SH), the IRGC Intelligence announced the arrest of four administrators of reformist Telegram channels on charges of “acting against security.” In 2019 (1398 SH), the FATA Police arrested several teenagers for initiating the “Momo Challenge” (an internet prank). Also, during the November 2019 (Aban 1398) protests, numerous individuals who wrote about the protests on Twitter and Instagram were identified and arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence. A list published by the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA – the organ of the Human Rights Activists in Iran collection) showed that at least 66 people were arrested for online activity during that event. During the nationwide protests of 2022 (1401 SH), more than 100 journalists, photojournalists, and cyberspace activists were arrested. Figures like Niloofar Hamedi and Elaheh Mohammadi (journalists covering the Mahsa Amini news) were detained for months, and dozens of Instagram page and Twitter account administrators were arrested or summoned by security forces. In January 2023 (Dey 1401), Reporters Without Borders announced that since the beginning of the protests, more than 100 Iranian journalists had been arrested. Although some were released after a while, many still face prison sentences, which has led to the prevalence of even more severe self-censorship on social networks.
Pressure on Iranians Abroad Active Online: The Iranian government has not refrained from harassing and intimidating journalists and media activists residing abroad. Journalists working for Persian-language media outside the country (such as BBC Persian, Iran International, Radio Farda, and Voice of America) are regularly threatened by security institutions. Leaked documents have shown that the names of more than 50 BBC Persian employees were on the Ministry of Intelligence’s pursuit list. The families of these journalists inside Iran have been pressured or banned from leaving the country to compel them to quit their jobs. In 2019 (1398 SH), it was even reported that several individuals associated with Iran International television in neighboring countries had been targeted for assassination attempts by agents of the Islamic Republic, or that assassination plots against them had been foiled. All these instances indicate that the scope of the Islamic Republic’s digital repression extends beyond the country’s geographical borders, targeting any influential critical voice.

Impact of Internet Censorship on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information

The aforementioned set of measures – from widespread filtering to the arrest and intimidation of users – has had profound effects on the atmosphere of Iranian society. The first evident consequence is the severe restriction of people’s free access to information. Millions of Iranian citizens are deprived of direct access to popular global websites and social networks, and to obtain information, they must either turn to state media or accept the cost and risks of using filter circumvention tools. This has effectively created an information gap: those who lack the technical or financial ability to bypass filters are exposed to the one-sided narrative of government media and are deprived of the free flow of news. The second consequence is the prevalence of self-censorship on the internet. Many users, fearing judicial prosecution, refrain from expressing their true opinions on social networks or resort to anonymous and private accounts. According to a Freedom House report, self-censorship among Iranian internet users is widespread, especially concerning political topics or criticism of officials. The experience of suppression after 2009 (1388 SH) caused many critical bloggers to cease their activities, and the once vibrant Persian blogosphere fell silent. Although a wave of courage in expressing criticism (even openly and under real names) was seen during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising in 2022 (1401 SH), its heavy cost – arrests and even death sentences issued for several individuals due to online content – still poses a great danger to online activists.

The third effect of digital censorship in Iran is the damage to business initiatives and technological development. Blocking global platforms like Google Play, PayPal, online advertising networks, etc., has disrupted internet businesses. Many small businesses that sold through Instagram suffered losses due to its filtering. The migration of skilled technology personnel from the country has also accelerated with the tightening of the internet environment. However, this topic is beyond the scope of our discussion, and this article will focus more on the aspect of freedom of expression.

In summary, in the realm of cyberspace as well, the Iranian government, relying on strict laws (Computer Crimes Law and resolutions of high security institutions), technical tools (filtering and internet shutdowns), and its security-judicial arm (FATA Police, IRGC Intelligence, Prosecutor’s Office), has managed to create one of the most repressive online environments in the world. The result of these actions has been a significant reduction in online freedom of expression and limited citizen access to free information. However, as evidence shows, Iranian society has also resisted these restrictions in various ways and strives to make its voice heard, even if through filter circumvention tools or foreign-based media.

Suppression of Freedom of Expression in Cultural and Artistic Fields

Freedom of expression is not suppressed solely within the political and media spheres; cultural, artistic, and literary domains in the Islamic Republic are also subjected to various restrictions and censorship. The Iranian regime, positioning itself as the guardian of “Islamic-Revolutionary culture,” bans or restricts any artistic or cultural expression deemed incompatible with official standards. From writers and poets to filmmakers, painters, musicians, and even civil cultural activists, all have experienced censorship and suppression over the past four decades. This section addresses some of the mechanisms of this cultural suppression and provides documented examples.

Mechanisms of Cultural and Artistic Censorship

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Book Department and Performance Monitoring Department): This ministry acts as a censor not only in the press, as previously mentioned, but also in the fields of books, music, and cinema. The Book Department, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Guidance, is responsible for issuing printing permits for books. According to the law, every book must receive approval from the Ministry before publication, and its censors review the text for compliance with Islamic principles and the interests of the system. Numerous instances exist where publishers have been forced to remove or amend sections of novels, poems, or historical books to obtain a permit. Sometimes, even after these revisions, the publication of a book is blocked at the last moment. For example, the novel “The Colonel” by Mahmoud Dowlatabadi has been awaiting a printing permit in Iran for years and, despite its international acclaim, has not been allowed publication. Furthermore, the Ministry of Guidance maintains a long list of banned books (primarily works by critical authors, books related to Baha’ism, new عرفان (mysticism/spiritual movements), or critical histories), the possession or distribution of which can lead to legal consequences.

Hozeh Honari (Artistic Domain) of the Islamic Propagation Organization: The Hozeh Honari is a state-funded governmental institution that supports cultural and artistic productions aligned with the regime’s ideology. In recent years, this institution has also used its influence for censorship purposes. Filmmakers have reported that the Hozeh Honari, controlling numerous cinemas across the country, refuses to screen certain authorized films deemed to have “immoral or anti-value content.” For instance, films like “Tales” directed by Rakhshan Banietemad or “The Paternal House” by Kianoush Ayari were boycotted by the Hozeh Honari for a period, despite having screening permits. The Hozeh Honari also holds influence in the film production permit council and prevents the creation of non-conformist films.

Cinema Organization (Cinema Monitoring Department): In the realm of cinema, all screenplays must be approved by the Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Cinema Organization (under the Ministry of Guidance). After production, the film is reviewed again to receive a screening permit. Government censors are often sensitive to the portrayal of political themes; for example, any film depicting political protests, violation of citizens’ rights by state institutions, or corruption among officials faces significant difficulty obtaining a screening permit. Additionally, the depiction of certain aspects of social life (such as relationships between boys and girls, music and dance, optional hijab, etc.) are considered red lines. A famous example is the film “Purple” directed by Ebrahim Hatamikia, which was banned for five years because it dealt with the activities of the Ministry of Intelligence. The film “The Paternal House” also remained banned for years due to its depiction of domestic violence against women. Many filmmakers are forced to rewrite their screenplays multiple times or delete scenes to pass censorship.

Music Council and Poetry and Song Unit of the Ministry of Guidance: In the music sector, the Ministry of Guidance also has a specialized unit that issues permits for song lyrics and the release of music albums. Lyrics must not contain political themes or content contrary to the government’s desired standards. Furthermore, female solo singers cannot obtain permits for public performance (concerts or albums). Only women’s participation in choirs, with their voices lower than men’s, is sometimes accepted. Many musicians, including rock, rap, or underground music groups, have never succeeded in obtaining official permits, and some have been prosecuted for unauthorized activities (such as the metal band “Exir” in Mashhad, whose members were arrested and instruments confiscated in 2018). Music concerts are also held under strict supervision, and the slightest infraction (e.g., rhythmic movement by the audience or improper hijab in the hall) can lead to the revocation of future concert permits. It has frequently occurred that concerts by authorized artists have been canceled at the last minute due to pressure from hardline forces.

Documented Examples of Suppression of Artists and Cultural Works

Banning Writers from Publishing and Traveling: The Iranian Writers’ Association (Kanun-e Nevisandegan), the oldest professional body defending freedom of expression in literature, has been targeted for suppression since the beginning of the revolution. In the 1990s, prominent members of this association, such as Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, were murdered by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence as part of the “Chain Murders.” In recent years, three members of the association’s board of secretaries – Baktash Abtin, Reza Khandan Mahabadi, and Keyvan Bajhan – were tried and sentenced to six years in prison each on charges of “propaganda against the system” and “assembly and collusion,” merely for compiling a history of censorship in Iran and publishing the association’s internal newsletter. They began serving their sentences in the autumn of 2020. Tragically, Baktash Abtin, a 47-year-old poet and filmmaker, died in Evin Prison in January 2022 due to COVID-19 and medical negligence. Abtin’s death was a shocking example of the consequences of the unjust imprisonment of intellectuals, sparking widespread international reactions. Generally, many independent Iranian writers are either denied permission to publish their works or, if they have a louder voice, face summons and security-related case fabrications. Reza Baraheni, Simin Behbahani, Abdollah Kowsari, and Gholamhossein Sa’edi (before his emigration and death in exile) are among the writers who have repeatedly experienced censorship and bans.

Banning and Preventing the Screening of Films: Film censorship has manifested in the banning of numerous feature films and documentaries. Perhaps the most famous case involves the prominent director Jafar Panahi. After supporting the 2009 protests, he was arrested in March 2010 and subsequently sentenced to six years in prison and a 20-year ban on filmmaking and leaving the country. Despite this severe (and unprecedented) sentence, Panahi unofficially made films inside Iran (such as “This Is Not a Film,” which was smuggled out of the country on a flash drive and screened at the Cannes Film Festival). Although Panahi was often under house arrest in subsequent years, he was rearrested in July 2022 and imprisoned for several months until finally being released on bail in February 2023. Another case is Mohammad Rasoulof, a critical filmmaker who was also sentenced to prison and banned from working; his films (including “Manuscripts Don’t Burn,” about the Chain Murders) are not allowed to be screened in Iran. Furthermore, older directors like Mohsen Makhmalbaf found that after leaving the country, all their works were banned in Iran, and even their names were censored from books and media. Makhmalbaf has five banned films in Iran, and almost all of Panahi’s films made after 1998 have not been permitted for screening in Iran.

Film bans do not only affect political works; social themes are also not immune to censorship. For example, the film “Paradise” (2015) directed by Ali Atshani was banned due to jokes about ISIS and religious seminaries. The film “Lovely Trash” by Mohsen Amiryoussefi, with its theme of national reconciliation, remained banned for six years. Even the successful film “The Lizard” (Kamal Tabrizi, 2003), which was released with a public screening permit, was pulled from cinemas after a few weeks due to protests from clerics. These cases demonstrate the extensive ideological red lines of the system, encompassing social satire and indirect criticism.

Suppression of Critical Artists and Actors: Artists in the fields of music, theater, and visual arts have not been spared from pressure. Mohammad Reza Shajarian, the master of Iranian classical singing, was banned from broadcasting after supporting the people during the 2009 protests, and none of his songs were aired on official media until his death. Shahin Najafi, a singer, was declared an apostate (takfir) and received death threats after performing songs with critical themes. In theater, plays addressing social criticism are sometimes banned; for example, the play “Hot Egg Tango” directed by Hadi Marzban was shut down after a few performances in 2017 due to some critical dialogues. Painters and sculptors also face censorship if they create works interpreted as political or immoral. In 2017, several paintings at the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art were removed by judicial order due to “suspicion of insulting sanctities.”

In addition to direct suppression, the government compels artists to cooperate or remain silent by creating an atmosphere of fear and job insecurity. Many film and television actors were threatened with work bans by the Ministry of Guidance for expressing solidarity with the 2022 (1401) protesters. For instance, when several female actors published photos of themselves without headscarves in protest against compulsory hijab, the Ministry of Guidance announced that these individuals would not have the right to artistic activity unless they expressed remorse. Such actions have caused a large number of well-known artists to emigrate or become inactive domestically in the last year or two.

The cumulative result of these restrictions and crackdowns is a pervasive atmosphere of self-censorship in the cultural and artistic sphere. Many writers, filmmakers, and artists, to avoid trouble, produce works that carefully steer clear of red lines. Others decide from the outset to publish their work abroad to escape the blade of censorship. Domestically, cultural productions are largely either state-sponsored and commissioned or, if artistic and independent, remain conservative in addressing profound social themes. Iran’s cultural community has suffered greatly over these years, and its natural growth and creativity have been chronically stifled.

The Impact of Censorship and Repression on Society

The continuous censorship and suppression of freedom of expression not only violate the individual rights of media and culture professionals but also have extensive consequences for society as a whole. This section examines some of these consequences on public opinion, social psychology, socio-political activities, and public trust.

Impact on Public Opinion and Social Awareness

One of the most evident results of censorship is the deprivation of society from accurate awareness and information. When free press and independent media are suppressed, the official channel for informing the public is mainly state-controlled media with a one-sided narrative. In Iran, the media monopoly of Seda va Sima (state-owned broadcasting) and the control of press content have for years caused many facts to be concealed from the people or distorted when conveyed to them. For instance, regarding the November 2019 protests, official media presented a near-zero account of protester casualties, and it was only months later that the people found out through international reports that hundreds had been killed in the streets. Or, concerning the downing of the Ukrainian airplane in January 2020, the news censorship and the three-day lying by state-controlled media severely damaged public trust. In such circumstances, people are forced to use unofficial sources (rumors, social networks, foreign media) to obtain news, which at times can also contain misinformation. In other words, censorship facilitates the flourishing of lies and rumors because when the transparent channel of information is blocked, the market for speculation and unverified news becomesActive.

On the other hand, the general culture of society is also harmed by censorship. The censorship of books and art prevents valuable cultural works from reaching the people, and the level of discourse and thought declines. For example, a young person who in a free society could develop a critical view and historical-political knowledge by freely reading various books, in a censored society either does not have access to these resources or does not find the motivation to seek them out. It is in this manner that autocratic governments, through censorship, keep the historical and political awareness of the people at a low level in order to have submissive and passive citizens. A clear example is the history textbooks in Iranian schools that teach the official government narrative, and no critical voice is heard in the official educational space. A society whose new generation only hears these one-sided narratives may remain unaware of their rights and the realities of the world outside.

Creating an Atmosphere of Fear and Self-Censorship

The continuation of the suppression of expression over the years has led to the formation of a culture of fear in society. Iranian citizens have learned that “not every word should be uttered everywhere.” Many people, even in private gatherings, refrain from expressing explicit political views, lest they be reported or suspected. This phenomenon of collective self-censorship is a direct product of the instances of repression that people have witnessed firsthand or heard about. In the words of Issa Saharkhiz (imprisoned journalist), “Journalism in Iran is like walking in a minefield”; this statement can be generalized to the entire society, where individuals do not know which speech or action of theirs may cause trouble for them. Social science researchers use the concept of the “spiral of silence” to describe such an atmosphere; that is, a majority who oppose the status quo remain silent due to fear, and thus the perception of a vocal minority as the dominant voice is conveyed.

This culture of fear has profound psychological and social effects. Horizontal trust among members of society decreases because it cannot be certain whether the listener of critical speech is a friend or an enemy. Also, trust in civil institutions is lost because many associations and NGOs have either been shut down or are under government control. Numerous reports and analyses have shown that the political repressions of recent decades in Iran have created a “collective trauma” whose consequences are deep distrust and social isolation. People in the public sphere are forced to wear a mask, which in turn causes dual personality and psychological problems. A part of the depression and sense of hopelessness observed in Iranian society is rooted in this suffocation and lack of fundamental freedoms.

From a political perspective, widespread fear prevents the formation of any organized collective movement. When there is no freedom of expression, it is obvious that there will be no freedom of assembly and association either. Even if people have deep grievances, they are reluctant to express them publicly or organize to demand them because they know the cost. In this way, the government, by creating terror, suppresses effective political participation. It should be noted, of course, that at times the mass fear has broken down—such as the 1979 revolution or the 2022 protests—but these instances have been exceptions, and after bloody crackdowns, society has once again been driven into a phase of fear and silence. In general, it can be said that censorship and the suppression of freedom of expression act like an invisible weapon that weakens the collective will of the people for change and prolongs the life of undemocratic governments.

Impact on Civil and Political Activities

Another important consequence of media suffocation is the severe weakening of civil society. In a country where there is no freedom of expression, it is natural that the formation of independent non-governmental organizations also faces obstacles. In Iran, independent civil institutions (such as the Writers Association, teachers’ and workers’ unions, human rights and environmental NGOs) have either been banned or are under constant pressure. The Center for Human Rights Defenders, led by Shirin Ebadi, was sealed off and declared illegal by security forces in 2008. The offices of the Association of Iranian Journalists were closed in 2009. Environmental organizations such as the Persian Wildlife Heritage Foundation were practically eliminated in 2017 with the arrest of their directors (including Kavous Seyed-Emami, who died in prison). Such blows to civil society would not have been possible without controlling the media space. Because if the media were free, they could support these associations and prevent arbitrary actions. In the absence of independent media, the government easily removes any independent institution from the scene with security charges, and not much of a voice is raised against it.

In the field of political activity, independent and critical parties do not have the opportunity to operate freely. The party law in Iran is stringent, and parties that explicitly criticize the system’s frameworks do not receive permits or are quickly revoked. In the 1980s, virtually all opposition parties were dissolved or suppressed. In later periods, even pro-regime parties (reformists) were repeatedly banned (such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Organization of the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin in 2010). In the absence of press freedom, this process was easily carried out, and official media did not even cover the news of the dissolution of these parties or justified it. The result has been the political passivity of a large segment of society. Ordinary people who have neither an independent party nor an independent media feel that their voices do not reach anywhere and that they have no influence in major decisions. This gradually leads to frustration and withdrawal from the public sphere. The decline in voter turnout in recent years (such as the participation rate of under 50% in the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections) partly reflects this distrust and political passivity.

Impact on Public Trust and National Solidarity

Public trust in any society is an important social capital that, if undermined, endangers the efficiency of the government and the cohesion of society. The suppression of freedom of expression has undermined public trust in several ways:

First, distrust of official media. Over the years, Seda va Sima and state-controlled press have lost their credibility with a large segment of the population by disseminating biased information or concealing facts. For example, an independent poll in the 2010s revealed that the level of trust of Tehran residents in Seda va Sima was less than 30%, while trust in Persian-language media outside the country was much higher. When people see that the official media do not tell the truth, they become pessimistic about the entire system. This distrust peaks in times of crisis; for example, in the case of the downing of the Ukrainian plane or the outbreak of the coronavirus in 2020-21, many people considered the official statistics and explanations to be false, which caused informational chaos and public anxiety.

Second, distrust of the rule of law and justice. When society witnesses a journalist being imprisoned for performing their duty of informing or an artist being banned from working for a work of art, it is natural to doubt the fairness of the judicial system and the rule of law. People feel that the laws, more than protecting their rights, are designed to suppress them. This feeling of injustice weakens the nation-state solidarity and increases the distance between the people and the rulers.

Third, loss of confidence in the future and the possibility of reforms. In a censored society, reformist or critical forces do not find the opportunity to emerge and operate. The media that can expose corruption and inefficiencies are shut down. Therefore, the power structure moves towards becoming more closed, and its internal reform becomes difficult. This issue has reduced the hope for gradual improvement of the situation in public opinion. Many people have concluded that as long as the structure of censorship and repression remains in place, no change will occur in the economic-political situation. Despair about reform and progress has also fueled the widespread emigration of elites and young people from the country, which has become a major problem in itself.

From the perspective of national solidarity, censorship has unfavorable effects. When the media are not free for a healthy national discourse to form, social divisions deepen. The government, with its dominant voice, promotes its desired narrative and silences other voices; this can lead to the polarization of society, because opponents of that narrative take refuge in foreign media or rumors, and a common national dialogue space does not form. A clear example is the division about ethnic and religious issues or women’s rights, which official media only address from the government’s point of view, and different viewpoints do not have the opportunity to emerge. This situation has made constructive dialogue between different groups difficult and reduced social capital.

By summarizing the above, it can be said that censorship and the suppression of freedom of expression in Iran, beyond violating the individual rights of journalists or artists, have created a widespread socio-political problem. A society with poorly informed or fearful and passive citizens will suffer from stagnation and lack of dynamism. Such a society is prone to various crises, including the collapse of trust and legitimacy. In fact, perhaps the greatest damage that suffocation has done to the Islamic Republic is the loss of moral legitimacy of the government in the eyes of a significant portion of the people; because people who see that the government is even afraid of hearing the voice of criticism no longer trust its authority and righteousness.

Conclusion

The investigation carried out in different sections of this article showed that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, using a range of legal, security, and technical tools, has severely restricted the space for freedom of expression both in the traditional arena (print and audio-visual media) and in the digital sphere. The main question of the research was, “How and with what tools does Iran suppress freedom of expression and censor the media and cyberspace?” The collected evidence provides a clear answer to this question: through a combination of repressive laws, powerful supervisory institutions, a decisive security-judicial apparatus, and the use of control technologies. The hypothesis put forward is also confirmed that the government, by creating an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship in society, tries to silence any opposing voice. This atmosphere of fear is reinforced on the one hand by heavy punishments (long imprisonments, flogging, execution, etc.) and on the other hand, it is justified and normalized by government propaganda.

The findings of this research can be summarized as follows:

In the field of traditional media: The Press Law and the Islamic Penal Code have created a framework that criminalizes almost any harsh criticism. The Press Supervisory Board and the judiciary, as soon as they observe a media outlet crossing the red lines, take action to shut down the publication and initiate legal proceedings. Security agencies such as the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC also play a behind-the-scenes role in directing these actions. Dozens of independent journalists have been imprisoned or forced to leave the country, and Iran is one of the largest prisons for journalists in the world. The result is a weak and intimidated press that has largely resorted to self-censorship.
In the field of the internet and social networks: The government, by creating a vast filtering infrastructure, has made access to independent information sources very difficult. Almost all global media and social networks are blocked in Iran, and the cost and risk of using VPNs fall on users. The Cyber Police, the IRGC Intelligence, and the Attorney General’s Office, by constantly monitoring cyberspace, suppress any popular critical content and arrest its publishers. Even ordinary users may be summoned to court or imprisoned for publishing a few critical posts. Despite the high penetration of the internet in Iran, one of the most closed online spaces prevails in this country.
In the field of culture and art: Censorship of artistic and literary works is applied through the Ministry of Guidance’s licensing mechanism (for books, films, music), and any work that deviates from the official ideology does not have the possibility of publication or display. Independent artists are under constant pressure, and some, like Jafar Panahi and Baktash Abtin, have paid heavy prices such as imprisonment and even death. This situation has led to the self-censorship of many creators of cultural works and has disrupted the dynamism and cultural diversity of society.
Social and political consequences: Iranian society, as a result of decades of suffocation, has suffered a deep wound called fear, which has destroyed trust among the people and trust in the government. Many people do not express many issues publicly, and discontent is driven underground. Healthy civil activity and independent parties have disappeared, and political participation has been reduced to nominal voting. This situation may create apparent stability in the short term, but in the long term, accumulated discontent can lead to sudden social explosions—as the protests of 2017, 2019, and 2022 showed how suppressed anger erupts.

Given these findings, suggestions can be made to combat censorship and improve the state of freedom of expression:

Pursuing international human rights pressures and mechanisms: International organizations and democratic governments should continue to pressure the Islamic Republic to comply with its human rights obligations. Appointing a UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression for Iran, continuously reporting on the situation of imprisoned journalists, and condemning cases such as the execution of Ruhollah Zam in international forums can raise the cost of repression for the government.
Strengthening Persian-language independent media abroad: Since there is currently no possibility of independent media inside Iran, overseas media (television, news websites, and social networks) practically play the role of the voice of the voiceless. Financial and technical support for these media, as well as the training of exiled journalists, can to some extent maintain the free flow of information into the country. Also, the development of anti-filter and secure technologies (such as proxies, resistant VPNs, decentralized platforms) is necessary so that Iranian citizens, despite filtering, can access news sources.
Continuous documentation and awareness-raising: Intellectuals and activists should document the process of censorship and repression for public opinion. Writing a history of censorship (which the Iranian Writers Association did, although it led to the imprisonment of its members), collecting the names of banned newspapers and imprisoned journalists, publishing an annual report on cases of artistic censorship, and so on all help to register in the collective memory. Awareness of the past can keep the new generation sensitive to the value of freedom of expression.
Professional solidarity and international support for people of the pen: Journalists, writers, and artists inside Iran need solidarity to demand their rights. Although their organizations have been suppressed, informal networks and mutual moral support can be somewhat effective. Alongside this, global professional institutions (such as the International Federation of Journalists, the PEN World, and art academies) must keep the cases of their imprisoned members in Iran alive and strive for their freedom. Such pressures have so far been effective in some cases and have led to the earlier release of some prisoners.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that freedom of expression is the cornerstone of other civil rights and freedoms. Without freedom of the press and the free flow of information, the fight against corruption, the realization of democracy, and comprehensive progress are not possible. The experience of countries that have achieved sustainable development shows that a free press and the accountability of rulers have been key factors. Regarding Iran as well, any step towards improving the political-economic situation requires opening up space for free national dialogue; a dialogue in which opponents and supporters can express their views without fear of repression, and people can participate consciously in decision-making.

Despite the current dark atmosphere, hope for a brighter future should not be lost. The contemporary history of Iran shows that the desire for freedom and justice has never been completely extinguished. Even in the midst of the most intense oppression, the voice of justice has been kept alive by courageous individuals. Today, too, Iranian youth, using new communication tools and global awareness, demand their fundamental rights. Although the government tries to suppress these demands with censorship and repression, the free flow of thought and ideas cannot be stopped forever. As the famous saying goes, “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.” Sooner or later, the truth will find its way. Freedom of expression, as one of the most obvious human rights, will also be the future of Iran; because without it, none of the ideals of development and progress are achievable. Iranian society, with all its wounds, is still alive and trying to break the walls of suffocation. The final vision is an Iran in which no journalist goes behind bars for writing, no citizen for tweeting, and no artist for creating a work of art, and “mouths are not shut and pens are not broken”; such a society is not a dream, but a right that the people of Iran deserve and are striving for.

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Forbidden Land: A Documentary Account of Media and Digital Censorship in the Islamic Republic

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