Emergence and Initial Formation in the 1970s
The “Komala” group (short for Komeleya Şorrişgêrrî Zehmetkêşanî Kurdistanî Êran, meaning the Revolutionary Organization of the Working Class of Iranian Kurdistan) was secretly founded in the late 1960s. According to some accounts, Abdollah Mohtadi and several other Kurdish students established the group in a clandestine meeting in Tehran on October 27, 1969. The founders of Komala were mainly left-wing Kurdish students studying at universities in Tehran and other major cities. These individuals included Fouad Mostafa Soltani, Mohammad Hossein Karimi, Abdollah Mohtadi, the Mosleh and Fatah Sheikh-Al-Islami brothers, Saeed Vatandoust, Yadollah Biglari, Iraj Farzad, and others. In its early years, Komala operated covertly in small cells, establishing networks in Kurdistan (Saqqez, Sanandaj, Marivan, and surrounding villages) and even in other Iranian cities such as Tehran and Tabriz. Over approximately nine years of underground activity, the organization managed to attract hundreds of revolutionary cadres from among workers, peasants, and intellectuals, creating a cohesive organizational structure.
Ideologically, Komala was initially a Marxist-Leninist group with Maoist leanings. Its founders believed that guerrilla warfare detached from the masses (such as the approach of the People’s Fedai Guerrilla Organization at the time) was an adventurous and incorrect path. They considered the correct path to be organic connection with the working class and peasantry, and their organization for revolution. In an internal pamphlet titled “Why Are We Scattered?” (published around 1972), the early leaders of Komala analyzed Iranian society as “semi-colonial, semi-feudal,” arguing that despite the Shah’s land reforms, feudal relations still prevailed. They denounced the Tudeh Party as “traitorous and opportunistic” for its compromise, and regarded the Soviet Union as a “social-imperialist” superpower. These positions reflected the influence of Maoist ideas and Komala’s emphasis on independence from the Soviet bloc. In summary, Komala’s approach in the 1970s was based on covert organizational work among the working masses and the cultivation of local cadres for future revolutionary opportunities.
Komala’s Role in the 1979 Revolution and the Early Post-Revolution Years
With the rise of the struggles of the 1979 Revolution, Komala, which had been organizing secretly for years, gradually began its open activity. During the final days of the Shah’s regime (February 1979), one of Komala’s founders, Mohammad Hossein Karimi, was wounded in an attack on the police station in Saqqez and died two days after the revolution’s victory. Following this event, Komala’s organization decided to abandon its clandestine status and announce its public existence in order to commemorate his memory and take advantage of the revolutionary conditions. Thus, February 15, 1979, was officially designated as the day of Komala’s public activity.
In the months and early years following the revolution, Komala quickly became an influential political-military force in Kurdistan. Komala’s cadres and supporters played an active role in establishing people’s councils; for instance, the “City Council of Sanandaj” and neighborhood associations were formed in Sanandaj through the initiative of Komala forces. During Nowruz 1979, coinciding with the referendum on the Islamic Republic system held nationwide, Kurdistan became a scene of unrest, and Komala, along with other leftist and Kurdish forces, boycotted the referendum. During the events known as the “Bloody Nowruz of Sanandaj” in April 1979, Komala forces (including Sediq Kamangar and Ayoub Nabavi) organized demonstrations and popular resistance in Sanandaj. Although these protests were suppressed with the intervention of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces, they marked the beginning of armed resistance in Kurdistan after the revolution.
One of Komala’s significant actions in 1979 was leading the “Historical Migration of the People of Marivan.” In protest against the presence of central government forces and their violence, the people of Marivan collectively abandoned the city at the initiative of Komala and camped in the mountainous regions. This unprecedented protest movement, organized by Fouad Mostafa Soltani (known as Kaka Fouad), attracted public attention and became known as a symbol of the Kurds’ civil resistance against government repression. Kaka Fouad, who played a key role in this migration, emphasized the unparalleled unity created among the people, considering it the great achievement of this struggle.
Another scene of conflict was the Paveh incident in August 1979, during which Komala forces, alongside Peshmerga of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), took control of the city of Paveh. This event provoked a strong reaction from the new leaders of the Islamic Republic; Ayatollah Khomeini issued his famous decree on August 19, 1979, calling for the severe suppression of the “Paveh outlaws.” Subsequently, the IRGC and the army entered the region with heavy forces and retook Paveh and other turbulent cities in Kurdistan. The series of clashes that occurred in Kurdistan from the spring of 1979 to the early 1980s can be interpreted as a kind of Kurdish uprising in the early years after the revolution. From the outset, Komala was at the forefront of this uprising and was among the first leftist groups to take up arms against the Islamic Republic.
Throughout the years 1979 to 1983, Komala also played a role in administering some liberated areas or those outside the control of the central government. For example, at times the city of Saqqez and the surrounding villages were under Komala’s influence, and a kind of revolutionary local governance was established. Komala also founded grassroots unions, such as the Peasants’ Union, Women’s Union, Unemployed Union, etc., which were the result of organizational work in previous years. These institutions were a practical manifestation of Komala’s slogan of self-organization of the masses in Kurdistan. During this period, Komala also had connections with a part of the nationwide left-wing movement in Iran but pursued an independent approach. For instance, in 1981, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) formed a front called the National Council of Resistance and invited all opponents to join, but Komala refused to join the National Council of Resistance. The reason for this was ideological and strategic differences; Komala considered itself a revolutionary Marxist current that did not want to be under the umbrella of a force with different ideology and goals (the People’s Mojahedin Organization and monarchists).
It is worth noting that Komala also suffered heavy losses during these years. Many of its cadres and supporters lost their lives in battles or under torture by government forces. Kaka Fouad Mostafa Soltani, the charismatic leader of Komala, was martyred on August 31, 1979, during an armed clash with IRGC forces near the Marivan-Baneh road. Fouad’s death at the age of 30 was a major blow to the fledgling Komala, but his comrades, such as Abdollah Mohtadi, continued his path. After Kaka Fouad, Abdollah Mohtadi effectively became the main figure in Komala’s leadership and took over the organization’s guidance.
Armed Conflicts of the 1980s and Political Activities
With the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the Kurdistan region became even more securitized and militarized. The new Iranian government, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, was unwilling to accept the demands for Kurdish autonomy and insisted on regaining full control of Kurdistan. Thus, in the early 1980s, fierce battles took place between the IRGC and army forces on one side, and Kurdish Peshmerga (consisting of Komala and the Democratic Party) on the other. Important Kurdish cities such as Mahabad, Sanandaj, Saqqez, Marivan, etc., changed hands several times between the two sides until finally government forces, using heavy equipment and deploying large numbers of troops, gained control of the cities and drove the opposition into the mountains and remote villages.
During this period, Komala, in addition to fighting the forces of the Islamic Republic, also faced the challenge of intra-Kurdish disputes. Although in the early years of the revolution, Komala and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) sometimes had coordination (for example, cooperation in Paveh), gradually the rivalry and ideological differences between them intensified. The older Democratic Party, with a nationalist approach, demanded Kurdish autonomy within the framework of Iran, while Komala, with a Marxist approach, emphasized class struggle and socialist revolution in addition to Kurdish national rights. Also, the Democratic Party, under the leadership of Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, pursued a policy of negotiation and diplomacy with the central government (as much as possible), while Komala believed in popular revolution. These differences in views led to a bloody internal conflict between Komala and the Democratic Party in the mid-1980s, which dealt a major blow to the Kurdish movement.
According to historical sources, a full-scale civil war broke out between Komala and the Democratic Party from 1984, which lasted until 1988. In September 1984, the Central Committee of the Democratic Party officially declared war against Komala, and in November 1984, Democratic Party forces attacked a Komala base in the Uraman region, killing several Komala Peshmerga and capturing and executing some. Following this, Komala also launched retaliatory attacks against Democratic Party positions in February 1985, and the civil war expanded. This unwanted war lasted about five years and inflicted casualties and damages on both sides until Komala unilaterally declared a ceasefire in 1988. During these conflicts, the Democratic Party also suffered an internal split (the split known as the “Eighth Congress” and the revolutionary leadership faction), which effectively weakened that party. The Komala-Democratic Party war, which was in fact a fratricidal war among Kurds, dealt a serious blow to the Kurdish liberation movement and caused division in the ranks of Kurdish forces. However, Komala argued that it had no choice but to stand up to the “hegemony and bullying” of the Democratic Party and not allow that party to become the undisputed dominant force in Kurdistan. On the other hand, the Democratic Party accused Komala of being the cause of escalating differences. In any case, this bitter period has remained in the historical memory of Kurdistan.
After the end of the internal conflicts and also the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the situation in Kurdistan became relatively calmer, and the Kurdish armed forces were forced to move their bases across the border (inside Iraqi territory). During the Iran-Iraq War, the Ba’athist regime of Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, took advantage of the differences between the central government of Iran and the Kurds and provided financial and military assistance to the Iranian Kurdish armed groups. Komala, like the Democratic Party, benefited from this support of the Ba’athist regime. Saddam’s goal was to weaken Iran from within during the war. However, after the war and especially after the uprising of the Iraqi Kurds and the establishment of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991, the Iranian Kurdish groups found a safer haven in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Komala’s main base was moved to camps in the Sulaymaniyah region and established far from the Iranian border to be safe from Iranian attacks. At the same time, relations were formed between these groups and the parties of the Kurdistan Region (the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Talabani). Due to its left-wing and socialist tendencies, Komala had a closer affinity with the Patriotic Union (Talabani) and established its main camp in the territory controlled by the Patriotic Union.
In the 1980s, Komala also underwent internal ideological transformations that determined its fate in the following years. Despite its initial adherence to Maoist principles, during the first Komala Congress in 1979 (after the revolution), Komala members concluded that Maoist formulas were not mechanically suitable for the conditions of Iranian Kurdistan. Therefore, some initial ideas were revised. Until 1983, Komala introduced itself as a Marxist-revolutionary organization with a priority on Kurdish issues, which tried to advance both the national struggle and the class struggle. In September 1983, Komala made a significant organizational change: in a structural transformation, Komala, along with several other communist groups, decided to form a comprehensive communist party called the Communist Party of Iran (CPI). Komala effectively became the Kurdistan organization of the Communist Party of Iran, and Abdollah Mohtadi was elected as the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Iran. This move was aimed at unifying the communist struggles throughout Iran and integrating the workers’ movement with the Kurdistan movement. Many Komala cadres became members of the new party, and Komala operated as the regional branch of the party.
Ideological Changes, Internal Divisions, and Leadership Developments
The formation of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI) in the 1980s marked the beginning of developments that would eventually lead to the fragmentation of Komala years later. In the 1990s, following the suppression of the Kurdish armed movement, a period of relative stagnation set in for Iranian Kurdish groups. The Islamic Republic regime, after the war, weakened the Kurdish movement by assassinating Kurdish leaders in Europe (the assassination of Dr. Ghassemlou in 1989 and Dr. Sharafkandi in 1992). Komala, which was operating within the framework of the CPI, was mainly involved in internal intellectual and organizational debates rather than practical action within the country. In the late 1980s and 1990s, many communist groups in Iran revised their ideologies; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led some leftist forces to embrace realism and distance themselves from revolutionary idealism. These conditions also affected Komala.
Abdollah Mohtadi, who was the Secretary-General of the CPI, gradually came to believe that Komala’s integration into the nationwide communist party had diminished Komala’s influence in Kurdistan. Mohtadi’s supporters argued that Komala, after joining the CPI, had lost its grassroots base and needed to return to its former independent identity by understanding the realities of Kurdish society. In contrast, the more leftist faction of the CPI (including Ebrahim Alizadeh and other communist leaders) considered this idea a “shift to the right” and a kind of bourgeois nationalism that contradicted Komala’s socialist ideals. As these differences intensified, a major split finally occurred in 2000. Abdollah Mohtadi, along with Omar Ilkhanizadeh and others, separated from the CPI and announced the establishment of a new organizational entity under the old name of “Komala Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan.” In other words, they claimed to have revived the original Komala. Mohtadi, who was one of the original founders of Komala, argued that Komala should return to its roots and engage in a more realistic struggle. The formation of this new Komala effectively meant the revival of an independent Kurdish party (separate from the framework of the CPI), which later became known as the Kurdistan Komala Party of Iran.
Following this split, Komala was divided into two branches: Mohtadi’s branch (the revived Komala) and the branch loyal to the CPI. The faction that remained in the CPI retained the name “Komala Organization of Kurdistan of the Communist Party of Iran” and continued its Marxist-Leninist orientation. That faction was led by Ebrahim Alizadeh, who became the Secretary-General of the CPI. Therefore, from the 2000s onwards, there were two parallel Komalas: one led by Mohtadi, which had a more nationalist and social-democratic tendency, and the other led by Alizadeh, which remained within the framework of the CPI and adhered to communist ideals.
Leadership changes continued in Mohtadi’s Komala. Although Abdollah Mohtadi remained at the head of the newly established party, internal disputes within Mohtadi’s Komala escalated in late 2007. Omar Ilkhanizadeh, who was one of the initiators of the 2000 split, this time himself came into conflict with Mohtadi. In 2007, he and his supporters separated from Mohtadi’s Komala and formed an independent party called Komala Toilers of Kurdistan. The reason for this separation was stated as a disagreement over the method of leadership and some ideological issues; it was reported that Ilkhanizadeh’s faction believed that Mohtadi’s leadership was not democratic enough and that the party was moving too far away from leftist ideals. Dissatisfaction with Mohtadi’s connections with forces outside the left spectrum (such as monarchist forces) was another source of contention. Specifically, in 2008, a group led by Abdollah Kanaan-Pooshi separated from Mohtadi’s Komala, citing their objection to Mohtadi’s cooperation with “monarchists, including Reza Pahlavi” as the reason. Over several years, three separate branches operated under the name of Komala: Mohtadi’s Komala (Kurdistan Komala Party of Iran), Ilkhanizadeh’s Komala (Komala Toilers of Kurdistan), and the Communist Komala (Komala Organization of Kurdistan of the Communist Party of Iran). This fragmentation naturally benefited the Islamic Republic and reduced the political influence of the Komalas.
In the 2010s, efforts were made to reunify the splintered sections. Abdollah Mohtadi and Omar Ilkhanizadeh, who had led two parallel Komala parties for years, finally reached an initial agreement to merge after lengthy negotiations. In November 2022, amidst the widespread protest movement following the killing of Zhina (Mahsa) Amini, the two parties announced that after 15 years of separation, they would once again unite and resume their joint activities under the single name of “Kurdistan Komala Party of Iran” and a unified leadership. This news was met with positive reactions among opposition forces, and it was hoped that a more cohesive force would emerge. However, it was not long before old differences resurfaced. In particular, Abdollah Mohtadi’s closeness to some right-wing opposition groups in Iran caused dissatisfaction among some sections of Komala. In early 2023, Mohtadi appeared as one of the signatories of the so-called “Georgetown Charter” (or the Charter of Solidarity and Organization for Freedom), which aimed to unite various groups opposed to the Islamic Republic. Mohtadi’s presence alongside figures such as Reza Pahlavi and Hamed Esmaeilion in this coalition was seen by the more leftist faction of Komala as a controversial move. Finally, in June 2023, the faction affiliated with Ilkhanizadeh announced that due to “the other side’s non-compliance with the agreements” and the emergence of political differences, the unification process had failed and they would resume their activities independently. This announcement was unfortunately accompanied by an armed clash between supporters of the two sides in the Zargewz camp (near Sulaymaniyah), which resulted in the death of two Peshmergas. Although attempts were later made to downplay the situation and deny the separation, the nascent unity of Komala did not last long, and the organization was once again divided into two parts.
Thus, in the early 2020s, we are witnessing three currents associated with the name of Komala: the Kurdistan Komala Party of Iran led by Abdollah Mohtadi (which considers itself the continuation of the historical Komala and has a social-democratic approach), Komala Toilers of Kurdistan led by Omar Ilkhanizadeh (which withdrew from the 2022 unification), and the Komala Organization of Kurdistan of the Communist Party of Iran led by Ebrahim Alizadeh (which follows the classic Marxist-Leninist approach). This fragmentation has been one of the serious challenges facing Komala in recent years.
Komala’s Role in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s
As mentioned, the 1990s was a period of transition for Komala and the broader Kurdish movement in Iran. Following the severe repression of the 1980s and the assassination of leaders, armed activity in Kurdistan experienced a significant decline, and the remaining leaders and forces were mainly based in exile (Iraq or Europe). In these circumstances, Komala tried to adapt itself to the new realities. The leadership of Komala/CPI (Mohtadi and his colleagues) realized that a prolonged armed struggle, without achieving autonomy or revolution, had led to the erosion of forces and popular support. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s created an atmosphere in which traditional leftist ideologies came under pressure worldwide. Komala was also forced to revise its strategy.
In the 1990s, Komala shifted its priority from guerrilla warfare to political and propaganda work. They established offices in Europe and the United States and made their voice heard by international institutions. Along with other opposing ethnic groups (including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Arab movements of Khuzestan, the Baluchis, and the Turkmens), Komala formed coalitions such as the Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran to promote the idea of federalism and ethnic rights in international forums. They also launched Kurdish and Persian-language media outlets to communicate with people inside the country.
In the 2000s, with the revival of Mohtadi’s Komala, the party tried to present a new image and discourse. The officially declared ideology of the new Komala was social democracy, and there was less emphasis on classic Marxist slogans. Komala presented itself as a defender of democracy, social justice, workers’ rights, and gender equality, and continued to emphasize the right of Kurds to self-determination in the form of autonomy or federalism in Iran. Organizationally, Mohtadi’s Komala launched a satellite television network called Rojhelat (meaning Eastern Kurdistan, referring to Iranian Kurdistan) in Sweden in 2006 to convey its messages to people inside Iran. Some reports indicate that this television network was established with financial assistance from the United States. In fact, during the presidency of George W. Bush, the United States had approved a budget under the Iran Freedom and Support Act to strengthen opposition groups in Iran. Although it is unclear how much of this aid reached Komala, Abdollah Mohtadi openly stated in 2008 that “if you are a political opposition movement, you need foreign aid… and we are not ashamed to say we want help.” This position of Mohtadi showed that the new Komala was willing to engage with Western countries to advance its goals, an approach that revolutionary leftists had rejected in the past.
In the 2010s, regional and domestic conditions in Iran once again highlighted the Kurdish issue. The emergence of new Kurdish groups such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in the early 2000s, which is considered the Iranian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) of Turkey, posed a new challenge for Komala and the Democratic Party. With its Apoist ideology and new guerrilla tactics, PJAK attracted many Kurdish youths and carried out significant armed operations against the Revolutionary Guards in the border regions in the mid-2000s. In contrast, Komala and the Democratic Party, under pressure from the Kurdistan Regional Government, were not inclined to disrupt border stability and had limited their armed activities. To the extent that it was said the traditional Iranian Kurdish parties (Komala and the Democratic Party) were observing an unwritten ceasefire with the Iranian government and were not engaged in significant military conflict. While this situation prevented further casualties and repression, younger critics believed it had led to the stagnation of the movement. To regain the initiative, Mohtadi’s Komala announced in 2017 that after years of ceasefire, it would reactivate its armed wing and resume the armed struggle against the Iranian regime. In practice, however, this struggle was mostly limited to the presence of Peshmerga near the border and the defense of camps, and no large-scale offensive operations were reported. The number of Komala’s Peshmerga forces is not very large either; a report by the Combating Terrorism Center in 2017 estimated the number of Komala (Mohtadi) members to be less than 1,000.
From a political perspective, Komala tried to be more active in the Iranian opposition scene in the 2010s. The party became a member of international organizations such as the Progressive Alliance – a global network of social-democratic parties – and raised its voice in human rights forums. Komala also worked with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan to create a united front of Iranian Kurds. Despite the bitter history of the internal war of the 1980s, the current leaders of Komala and the Democratic Party have relatively positive relations and have issued joint statements on occasion. Both groups now advocate for federalism within the framework of a united Iran and do not pursue separatism (at least at the level of rhetoric) in order to form coalitions with other Iranian forces. For example, Abdollah Mohtadi has repeatedly stated in recent years that “we are seeking federalism for Iran” and does not consider secession as his goal. This change of discourse has enabled Komala to participate in inclusive opposition coalitions. As mentioned, in February 2023, Mohtadi was one of the signatories of the “Charter of Solidarity for Freedom” along with non-Kurdish figures, which was a historic step in bringing Kurds closer to the mainstream opposition.
Komala’s Current Situation in the 2020s and Activities Abroad
With the onset of the 2020s, the political atmosphere in Iran became heated following the 2022 protest movement. Kurdistan, as in the past, was one of the centers of protests, and the slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom) spread from Kurdistan to the rest of Iran. In these circumstances, Kurdish parties, including Komala, tried to play a more active role. While providing media and political support for the protests, Mohtadi’s Komala sought to raise the demands of the Kurds in the vision of Iran’s future by participating in opposition coalitions abroad. The Georgetown Charter (Mahsa Charter), in whose drafting Komala was also involved, emphasized the need to recognize ethnic identities, education in the mother tongue, and the decentralization of power (federalism) in tomorrow’s Iran. This was an important turning point because for the first time a representative of a Kurdish party (Abdollah Mohtadi) stood alongside a spectrum of national figures and brought the demands of ethnic groups into the discourse of the mainstream opposition.
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic reacted strongly to the movements of the Kurdish opposition during the 2022 protests. Since late September 2022, the Revolutionary Guards have repeatedly targeted the headquarters of Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan (including Komala camps in Zargewz and near Sulaymaniyah) with suicide drones and ballistic missiles. In these attacks, civilians and Peshmergas were killed and wounded, and damage was inflicted on the camps. The Islamic Republic accuses these parties of having a “provocative and separatist role” in the protests inside the country, and justifies military action against them with this excuse. The intensity of these attacks has led the Iraqi government, under pressure from Iran, to sign an agreement with Tehran to disarm the armed members of Iranian Kurdish parties and move them away from the border. It was reported by the end of summer 2023 that the Iraqi government had acted on this agreement and moved the Peshmergas of Kurdish parties (including Komala) further away from the Iran-Iraq border and housed them in camps under its supervision. Although party representatives did not fully confirm this news, it is clear that the pressure of the Islamic Republic on the Kurdistan Region to limit the opposition has increased. This situation has left the future of Komala’s Peshmerga forces in a state of uncertainty and may further reduce their military freedom of action.
In the leadership arena, Mohtadi’s Komala is still led by Abdollah Mohtadi, who has been one of the main figures in the organization since 1979. Mohtadi is now about 75 years old and is considered the most veteran leader of a Kurdish party in Iran. On the other side, Omar Ilkhanizadeh (born in 1952) leads Komala Toilers. In the Communist Komala, Ebrahim Alizadeh is the Secretary-General. These three leaders, who are all from the first generation of the 1979 revolution, are trying to represent the demands of the Kurds despite their differences. Their relations with each other have sometimes been tense, but they have similar positions against the central government.
Komala’s activities abroad mainly include political diplomacy, communication with human rights organizations, media and coalition-building among Iranian expatriates, as well as communication with other Kurdish movements in the region. Komala is a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), and its representatives have spoken at various international forums about the violation of Kurds’ rights in Iran. The party has also registered an official lobby in the United States since 2018 to convey its demands to American statesmen. Although Iran has placed Komala on its list of terrorist groups, and even Japan has included it in its blacklist, Komala is trying to gain more legitimacy in the international arena by changing its image to that of a political and peaceful party.
Ideology and Political Views of Komala
Komala’s ideology has undergone significant changes since its inception. At its founding in the 1970s, Komala was explicitly a revolutionary communist organization with a Maoist orientation. The theoretical works of its founders show they believed in class struggle and the establishment of a classless society, viewing the liberation of Kurdistan as intertwined with the socialist revolution in Iran and the world. The organization’s full name at that time – “Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan” – reflects this emphasis on the working class. At that stage, Komala promoted a kind of proletarian internationalism and considered mere nationalism a narrow-minded approach. It thus defined itself in opposition to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (with its traditional nationalist bent) and sought to link the Kurdish movement to the socialist movement. In the 1970s and 80s, Komala was even distinct in its analysis from other leftist groups in Iran; for instance, unlike the People’s Fedai Guerrilla Organization, it rejected guerrilla warfare separate from the masses and emphasized organizational work among the people. In terms of global alignment, it had an anti-Russian (anti-Soviet) and pro-Maoist tendency, a stance few groups in Iran held at that time.
However, these positions evolved over time. As mentioned, at its 1979 congress, Komala officially abandoned parts of its Maoist dogmas and declared that the conditions in Iranian Kurdistan required a different strategy. In the 1980s, with the formation of the Communist Party of Iran, Komala adopted orthodox Marxism-Leninism and effectively became part of a nationwide leftist party. Yet this situation did not last long, and the 2000 split once again prioritized the national question. After 2000, Komala under Mohtadi underwent a broad ideological revision, criticizing some of its past views. For example, they deemed the reports presented to the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Iran in 1995 as “un-Marxist” and involving excessive concessions to bourgeois nationalist groups. This critique was in fact a reaction to what Mohtadi and his allies saw as the Communist Party’s deviation from revolutionary principles. The new Komala claimed it sought an indigenized and realistic Marxism for Kurdish society, distancing itself from abstract idealism.
As a result of these revisions, Komala under Mohtadi today can be considered a center-left and social-democratic party. The party explicitly defends liberal democracy, human rights, social justice, and the rights of women and minorities in its statements. Also, in contrast to its past skepticism towards the West, it now welcomes international cooperation to promote democracy in Iran. On the national question, Komala advocates for the autonomy of Kurdistan within a federal Iran, emphasizing Iran’s territorial integrity in its official documents while demanding a fair distribution of power and recognition of Kurdish identity. In other words, in Komala’s view, the solution to the Kurdish question in Iran’s future lies in establishing a democratic federal system in which Kurds would manage their own affairs in Kurdish-populated provinces and recognize Kurdish as an official language alongside Persian. This position, of course, has always been attacked by the Iranian government as “soft separatism,” but Komala argues that federalism would strengthen Iran’s lasting unity and has successful examples in the world (such as Switzerland, Germany, India, etc.).
Komala has also had progressive views on women’s rights. From the early 1980s, Komala was the first political group in the Middle East to officially bring women into its military apparatus. Dozens of Kurdish women joined the ranks of Komala’s Peshmerga, among whom one can mention Maleka Mustafa Soltani (sister of Kaka Fouad), who was among the first female Peshmergas of Komala. Komala has always emphasized the equality of men and women, women’s right to political participation, and the struggle against patriarchal traditions. The party also made efforts to increase women’s literacy and awareness in the rural areas of Kurdistan, which, although remaining unfinished due to the war conditions, has had a positive effect in the historical memory of Kurdish women.
Regarding religion, Komala is a secular organization. The vast majority of its members and leaders have been Sunni Kurds, but Komala’s discourse is based on the separation of religion and state and freedom of belief. In recent years, Komala has tried to establish better relations with Alawi (Yarsani) and even Shia Kurds, and diversify its base in terms of religion as well. This is in line with the new strategy of increasing inclusiveness and representation of all segments of Kurdish society.
Evaluation of Komala’s Strengths and Challenges
- Strengths and Achievements:
Komala is undoubtedly one of the oldest and most experienced political currents in Iranian Kurdistan, having gone through more than five decades of struggle. The party has experience in both covert and overt organizing under the most difficult conditions, and has trained ideological cadres. Komala’s social network in Kurdistan, despite the blows it has received, still exists; many Kurdish families have passed down from generation to generation the memory of Komala’s positive activities in the late 1970s and early 1980s (forming councils, peasant unions, defending villages, etc.). This social capital can be an asset for Komala in critical political junctures. Also, in terms of thought, Komala has made an important contribution to the modernization of Kurdish society; the group promoted concepts such as class struggle, women’s equality, secularism, and social justice in Iranian Kurdistan, and trained many Kurdish intellectuals and leftist activists. Komala’s publications, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts in the 1970s and 80s played a significant enlightening role in remote areas and conveyed the message of social revolution to Kurdish peasants and workers.
From a military perspective, although Komala never had the equipment or manpower of its Iraqi counterparts (the Peshmerga of Barzani and Talabani), Komala’s Peshmerga were known for their courage and discipline. They resisted the Revolutionary Guards in the mountains of Kurdistan for years and maintained the security of their camps in Iraq even after retreating. For example, it has been reported that in the Zargewz camp, Komala’s Peshmerga were trained to use anti-aircraft weapons and RPGs. This continuous presence of the Peshmerga force – although currently inactive – is a potential bargaining chip in political negotiations; the Iranian government must always be concerned that these forces could return inside in the event of a power vacuum.
In the field of ethnic organizing, Komala and HDKA have managed to turn the movement of Iranian Kurds into one of the best-organized minority movements in Iran. In a sense, compared to some other ethnic groups (such as Arabs or Baluchis), Iranian Kurds have more cohesive political parties and organizations, which is the result of decades of efforts by Komala and other groups. This political organization can be an asset for advancing the demands of Kurdish-populated regions in the future.
- Challenges and Weaknesses:
Komala’s most significant challenge in recent years has been division and fragmentation. Successive splits (1989 – separation of the Hekmat faction and formation of the Worker-communist Party; 2000 – separation of Mohtadi; 2007 – separation of Ilkhanizadeh; 2023 – failure of reunification) have diminished Komala’s energy and credibility. These schisms have also confused supporters; for example, an ordinary Kurdish villager may not know the difference between Komala of Mohtadi and Komala of Alizadeh, and this multiplicity distorts Komala’s message. Although the parties themselves try to explain the distinctions, in practice these divisions have overshadowed Komala’s historical credibility. In contrast, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, despite a split in the 1980s, later acted more coherently and is now divided into only two branches (HDKA and HDK – two branches of the Democratic Party), which is better than Komala’s situation.
Another issue is the decline of internal influence. Since the late 1980s, Komala has practically had no overt organized presence in Iranian Kurdistan, and its base has been outside the border. The new generation of Iranian Kurds (born after 1981) has had less direct contact with Komala. Although Komala’s ideas and name are still attractive or respected to many, geographical and temporal distance has taken its toll. In the past two decades, in some protests in Kurdistan, slogans were chanted in favor of PJAK (and even PKK), while there was no mention of Komala or HDKA. This shows that newer groups are gaining popularity, and older parties, if they cannot modernize themselves, may become generationally obsolete. Komala of Mohtadi has tried to reduce this distance by publicizing itself in the media (television, social networks), but the limited access to the inside remains.
Another challenge is dependence on the Kurdistan Region and its considerations. As long as Komala’s base is on Iraqi soil, it is forced to align its policies to some extent with the wishes of the Kurdistan Regional Government and even the central government of Iraq. For example, when the Kurdistan Regional Government, due to trade relations with Tehran, pressures Iranian parties to remain calm, Komala is forced to remain silent. This situation deprives Komala of its initiative and makes it a hostage to the interests of others. Analysts have pointed out that the long life in Iraqi exile has caused Komala’s leaders to sometimes have their views and positions more influenced by the experiences of Iraqi Kurdistan than the realities of Iranian Kurdistan. This lack of accurate understanding of the internal conditions can lead to the adoption of ineffective strategies. To solve this problem, some suggest that Iranian Kurdish parties should redefine their policies independently of the parties in the Kurdistan Region, and even if necessary, disperse the Peshmerga and transfer them covertly inside Iran. Of course, this is very risky and has not been done so far.
Among Komala’s other challenges is competition with the Democratic Party and PJAK. Although Komala and the Democratic Party do not differ much in strategy now (both are pro-federalism and opposed to the armed regime), in practice they compete with each other to gain a social base in Kurdistan. The Democratic Party, with its longer history and charismatic figures (Qasemloo and Sharafkandi in the past, Mustafa Hijri at present), has a major share in the political authority of the Kurds. PJAK, with its promotion of Apoist ideology and a network of covert supporters inside, has attracted another part of society, especially radical youth. As a result, Komala has to make more efforts to maintain and expand its influence. Fortunately, Komala’s leftist and justice-seeking discourse is still attractive to the working class and intellectuals of Kurdistan, and this is considered a trump card for it.
Finally, the label of “separatist terrorist group” that the Iranian government has placed on Komala and its counterparts is an obstacle in the path of the party’s normal political activity. The official media and books in Iran have for years portrayed Komala as responsible for violent acts – including accusations such as killing innocent people, beheading soldiers for wedding celebrations (!), collaboration with the invading enemy (Saddam), etc. Many of these claims are exaggeration or distortion, but they have had an effect on non-Kurdish public opinion. Therefore, Komala does not have a positive image in the minds of a segment of Iranian society, and even some opponents of the government are pessimistic about it. Komala has tried to change this image by participating in nationwide coalitions and talking to Persian-language media, presenting itself as a pro-democracy force seeking peaceful reform. This process must continue to narrow the mental gap between the struggles of Kurdistan and other parts of Iran.
Komala’s Role in Iran and Kurdistan’s Political and Social Developments
During more than fifty years of activity, Komala has had significant impacts on the political scene of Kurdistan and even Iran. At the level of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala was one of the main architects of the new Kurdish movement in the post-Shah era. By forming people’s councils in 1978, the group created a short but valuable experience of local democratic self-governance, which showed that Kurds can take charge of their own affairs. Also, the mass armed resistance that Komala and other groups organized forced the central government to keep a large part of its forces engaged in Kurdistan for years. Some analysts believe that the Kurdish uprising in 1979-80 prevented the Islamic Republic from focusing all its attention on suppressing other opponents in the center; in other words, the regime was caught on several fronts, which gave other movements the opportunity to survive a little longer (although they were all eventually suppressed). In the socio-cultural dimension, Komala played a significant role in promoting political literacy and class consciousness in Kurdistan. The villages of Kurdistan, which were previously under the influence of traditional Khans and clerics, became familiar with concepts such as peasants’ rights, the necessity of real land reform, ethnic equality, and social justice with the presence of Komala. Although many of these ideals were never realized in practice, their seeds were sown in the minds of the people. Also, Komala and other leftist groups caused Kurdish society to be somewhat immunized against the wave of religious reaction after the revolution. For example, while in many parts of Iran Islamist forces immediately seized revolutionary institutions, in Kurdistan, pro-government clerics could not gain control for several months after the revolution because Komala and HDKA held sway. This experience is recorded in the historical memory of Kurds that in 1978, Kurdistan was the only region whose people’s revolution did not submit to the rule of Shia clergy.
At the broader level of Iranian politics, the presence and resistance of Komala and other Kurdish parties kept the issue of ethnic rights alive in Iran’s political discourse. Although the Islamic Republic never recognized the demands of the Kurds, it could not deny the existence of a “Kurdish question” in Iran. This was reflected to some extent in the constitution; for example, Article 15 of the constitution allows the teaching of local languages, which would undoubtedly not have been achieved without the pressure of Kurds and Turks. Also, Komala and HDKA, by continuing their activities abroad, did not allow the file of massacres and suppressions in Kurdistan to be forgotten, and constantly presented their own narrative of contemporary history by publishing documents and books. In recent years, Komala has tried to be a bridge between ethnic movements and the nationwide democracy movement in Iran. Actions such as participating in the drafting of the “Mahsa Charter” or trying to get closer to Azerbaijani, Arab, and Baluchi activists are of great importance and can lead to the formation of a comprehensive front to transition from tyranny in the future. From this perspective, Komala has found a role beyond a local party and has become an influential player in Iran’s opposition.
Of course, it should not be forgotten that Komala, like any other movement, has had mistakes and shortcomings. The period of the Kurdish civil war in the 1980s is a prime example that perhaps could have been avoided with prudence and moderation. Also, some extremist actions in the years of turmoil (such as the summary execution of those accused of collaborating with the regime by the Peshmerga), although understandable in the context of war, were not acceptable to public opinion and portrayed the Kurdish struggles as violent. Komala itself later criticized some of these actions and changed its approach. Now, after years of ups and downs, it seems that Komala has gained more maturity and is ready to adopt a political and civil approach instead of a prolonged armed struggle, unless circumstances once again impose war.
Conclusion
Komala was born out of the conditions of repression in the 1970s and the historical discrimination against Kurds, and has gone through many ups and downs during more than four decades of continuous struggle. This organization, which once dreamed of a peasant revolution inspired by Mao, has now become a pragmatic party that thinks of free elections and federalism. In periods of history, Komala was a decisive force in the power equations of Kurdistan and had profound effects on Kurdish society; from mobilizing the peasants of Marivan to the political education of women and youth. Although suppression and exile have diminished that former influence, Komala is still an inseparable part of the Kurdish question in Iran. Without understanding the demands and participation of forces such as Komala and the Democratic Party, a lasting solution to the problem of the center and periphery in Iran will not be possible. In recent years, Komala has shown that it is ready to play a constructive role in Iran’s democratic transition; from dialogue with other ethnic and nationwide groups to moderating its demands within the framework of the country’s territorial integrity.
Komala’s future depends on several key factors: internal unity, communication with the young generation inside, and political initiative alongside other pro-democracy currents in Iran. If Komala leaders can put aside their old differences and have a unified voice, and if they establish a stronger communication channel with the inside of the country (through covert or social networks), they will be able to turn the legacy of decades of struggle into an effective force in determining the fate of Kurdistan and Iran. In contrast, the continuation of division or insistence on obsolete approaches may marginalize this historical party.
In a macro view, Komala is a symbol of the intersection of two liberation struggles: a nation’s struggle for its cultural-political rights, and a class’s struggle for liberation from economic oppression. Combining these two struggles has been very difficult, and Komala has sometimes been successful and sometimes unsuccessful in doing so. But this very attempt to link national freedom and social justice is a value that distinguishes Komala from many purely ethnic movements and can be inspiring in the Iran of the future. With all the criticisms leveled against it, Komala has shaped an important part of the contemporary history of Kurdistan and Iran’s left-wing movement, and is an inseparable chapter of the turbulent story of the people of this region.
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